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SECURITIES LAW
I.

ATTORNEYS' FEES DENIED IN PRE-SUIT RESCISSION UNDER SOUTH
CAROLINA SECURITIES ACT

In Brockmann Industries v. CarolinaSecurities Corp.' the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a South Carolina District Court's decision denying attorneys' fees to two dissatisfied securities holders who

had accepted offers of rescission 2 under section 35-1-1530 of the South
Carolina Uniform Securities Act (Securities Act).3 Facing a novel question of state law without the benefit of decisions from other jurisdictions, 4 the Fourth Circuit established a clear rule for attorneys' fees
under section 35-1-1530: When an offer to rescind meets statutory requirements, 5 the plaintiff cannot recover attorneys' fees incurred in
seeking rescission.

In Brockmann, Kronenfeld, an agent of Carolina Securities, sold
7,000 shares of stock worth $63,000 to the Brockmanns. The
Brockmanns, however, did not receive a copy of the company's prospectus until five months after receiving confirmation of the sale. Accordingly, when the price of the stock began to fall, Brockmann requested that Carolina Securities rescind the transaction because of
several "misrepresentations" made by Kronenfeld 7 and for failing to

1. 861 F.2d 798 (4th Cir. 1988).
2. For a general explanation and discussion of this procedure, see Rowe, Rescission Offers Under Federal and State Securities Law, 12 J. CORP. L. 383 (1987) and
Bromberg, Curing Securities Violations: Rescission Offers and Other Techniques, 1 J.
CORP. L. 1 (1975).
3. S.C. CODE ANN. § 35-1-1530 (Law. Co-op. 1987). This section of the South Carolina Code comes from section 410(e) of the Uniform Securities Act (1956), see UNIF. SEC.
ACT § 410(e), 7B U.L.A. 509, 643 (1985), which has been adopted by thirty-seven jurisdictions. See id. at prefatory note (Supp. 1987 at 30).
4. The court noted that it was unable to find any cases on this section in any of
the states that have adopted the Model Act. See Brockmann, 861 F.2d at 800. Some
commentators, however, assume that recovery under a rescission offer precludes recovery
for attorneys' fees. See, e.g., Rowe, supra note 2, at 403.
5. See infra note 17.
6. Brockmann, 861 F.2d at 798-99. As president of Brockmann Industries, Mr.
Brockmann purchased 5,000 shares for $45,000 and Mrs. Brockmann purchased 2,000
shares for $18,000. The claims, however, were made together.
7. Initially Kronenfeld urged Brockmann to purchase the new issue to secure immediate gains in the secondary market. Id. at 799. When the stock took an unexpected
downturn, however, and Brockmann wanted to sell, Kronenfeld advised him to hold the
stock. Id.
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provide a prospectus.8
Twice Carolina Securities refused the Brockmanns' request to rescind. However, when the Brockmanns' attorney discovered that
Kronenfeld had sold the securities without a license, as required by
section 35-1-410 of the Securities Act,9 Carolina Securities agreed to
rescind the deal. Following the guidelines of section 35-1-1530,10 Carolina Securities offered to return the Brockmanns' $63,000 along with
six percent interest computed from the date of sale. The Brockmanns
accepted the offer on the condition that Carolina Securities pay over
$16,000 in attorneys' fees. Carolina Securities refused the counteroffer,
arguing that, unlike section 35-1-1490, section 35-1-1530 did not provide for attorneys' fees.1" The Brockmanns then unconditionally accepted the offer. After cashing the tendered checks, however, the
Brockmanns again demanded attorneys' fees. When Carolina Securities
refused to pay, the Brockmanns filed suit in federal district court alleging violations of the Securities Act. In response, Carolina Securities
filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under 12(b)(6) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 2 The district court granted the
motion.13
Even though the South Carolina Supreme Court had not considered the issue of attorneys' fees for section 35-1-1530, the Fourth Circuit declined to certify the question and decided the issue on the face

8. Failure to provide a prospectus violates the Securities Act. See S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 35-1-990 (Law. Co-op. 1987).
9. S.C. CODE ANN. § 35-1-410 (Law. Co-op. 1987) (unlawful for any broker-dealer
or issuer to employ an agent unless the agent is registered).
10. South Carolina Code section 35-1-1530 provides:
No person may sue under [section 35-1-1490 or 35-1-1500] ... (a) if the buyer
received a written offer, before suit and at a time when he owned the security,
to refund the consideration paid together with interest at six percent per year
from the date of payment, less the amount of any income received on the security, and he failed to accept the offer within thirty days of its receipt ....
S.C. CODE ANN. § 35-1-1530 (Law. Co-op. 1987).
11. South Carolina Code section 35-1-1490 provides:
Any person who:
[Violates a provision of the Securities Act] [i]s liable to the person buying
the security from him, who may sue either at law or in equity to recover the
consideration paid for the security, together with interest at six percent per
year from the date of payment, costs, and reasonable attorneys' fees, less the
amount of any income received on the security, upon the tender of the security
S.C, CODE ANN. § 35-1-1490 (Law. Co-op. 1987).
12. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
13. See Brockmann Indus. v. Carolina Sec. Corp., 677 F. Supp. 430 (D.S.C. 1987),
af'd, 861 F.2d 798 (4th Cir. 1988).
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of the statute.' First, the court considered whether section 35-1-1490
provided for recovery of attorneys' fees for a suit resolved under section 35-1-1530. The court decided that section 35-1-1530 only provided
for attorneys' fees incurred for rescission obtained through litigation. 0
Furthermore, since rescission under section 35-1-1530 precludes suit
under section 35-1-1490,'1 the court concluded that a valid rescission
offer relieves the offeror of any subsequent liability for securities law
violations.17

In support of its decision, the court discussed the securities law
policies behind section 35-1-1530. First, the court noted that "[t]he
purpose of [the section] is to 'allow parties to avoid litigation and
quickly settle their differences.' "I Thus, the litigation that would result if section 35-1-1490 were interpreted as providing attorneys' fees
for section 35-1-1530 would undercut the purpose of rescission.' 9
Second, the court rejected the Brockmanns' argument that the remedial and protective nature of the securities laws justified attorneys'
fees under section 35-1-1530. Conceding that a narrow interpretation
of section 35-1-1530 benefited sellers by allowing them to limit their
liability for securities violations, the court believed that its interpretation benefited buyers more by guaranteeing an expedited resolution of
the dispute and, most importantly, a refund of their investment with
interest.2 0
Arguably, this rationale does not support the court's decision. No
doubt, section 35-1-1530 rescission benefits consumers, since they are
able to avoid protracted and sometimes risky litigation. Nevertheless,
consumers may be hurt in the long run. By eliminating the harsh remedies of the securities laws, the seller's downside risk is limited to a

14. Brockmann, 861 F.2d at 800 n.2.
15. Id. at 801.
16. Id.; see supra note 10.
17. Id. To be valid under section 35-1-1530, an offer must be made in writing
before commencement of suit and must proffer to refund the consideration paid plus six
percent interest from the date of sale. See supra note 10. Failure to meet these requirements may subject the offeror to attorneys' fees under section 35-1-1490 if the buyer

chooses to sue. For example, the Fourth Circuit already has determined that a buyer can
recover attorneys' fees in a suit over the adequacy of the offer. See Dixon v. Oppenheimer & Co., 739 F.2d 165, 168 (4th Cir. 1984) (construing similar section under the
Virginia Uniform Securities Act). Additionally, even if rescission ends a seller's liabilities
under the state's blue sky laws, the buyer may face continuing liability under the federal
securities laws. See Rowe, supra note 2, at 426-29.
18. Brockmann, 861 F.2d at 801 (quoting Merchant v. Oppenheimer & Co., 568 F.
Supp. 639, 642 (E.D. Va. 1983) (construing similar provision of Virginia Securities Act),
rev'd in part on other grounds, 739 F.2d 165 (4th Cir. 1984)).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 802.
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mere refund plus interest. Thus, sellers may be more willing to speculate in unsound investments, knowing they will be able to avoid adverse repercussions with rescission.
Sections 35-1-1490 and 35-1-1530, however, were not enacted primarily to deter securities fraud, but instead to provide a means by
which investors could recover their money. Furthermore, the deterrence effect of section 35-1-1530 is insignificant when considered in
light of other legal mechanisms designed to prevent securities fraud.
These mechanisms include punitive damages under common law fraud,
administrative proceedings by the Securities Exchange Commission
and criminal sanctions under state and federal anti-fraud provisions.
Accordingly, the court's denial of attorneys' fees under section 35-11530 did not violate the remedial and protective "spirit" of the securities laws.
The Fourth Circuit's decision appears justified on the facts of
Brockmann, an ideal test case. The Brockmanns unconditionally accepted the rescission offer, knowing attorneys' fees were not included.
Furthermore, Carolina Securities obviously made a Valid offer by carefully complying with section 35-1-1530. Although more complex factual
scenarios will arise, the Brockmann rule should still aid courts with
resolving similar disputes. Clearly, Brockmann has established another
needed guidepost in the relatively uncharted area of South Carolina
securities law.
James K. Lehman

II. SOUTH CAROLINA LONG-ARM STATUTE FAILS TO REACH OUT-OFSTATE LAWYERS ISSUING TAX OPINION LETTERS USED IN INVESTMENT
SCHEMES VIOLATIVE OF STATE SECURITIES LAWS

In Allen v. Columbia FinancialManagement21 the South Carolina
Court of Appeals backed away from its long-standing tradition of investor protection under the South Carolina Securities Act.2 2 The court
held that out-of-state lawyers involved in the marketing and servicing
of tax shelter investments were not subject to the South Carolina long-

arm statute, despite alleged fraud and misconduct by promoters. By
abandoning the "substantial factor" test,2" the court missed a signifi-

21. 297 S.C. 481, 377 S.E.2d 352 (Ct. App. 1988) (per curiam).
22. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 35-1-10 to -1590 (Law. Co-op. 1987).
23. The traditional test for identifying a seller under the securities laws is to deter-

mine whether a person was a "substantial factor" in inducing the investor to purchase
the securities in question. See, e.g., Jett v. Sunderman, 840 F.2d 1487, 1491 (9th Cir.
1988).
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cant opportunity to reaffirm its intolerance of abusive behavior by investment promoters. This decision may signal a significant shift in judicial philosophy. It certainly is inconsistent with the court's earlier
observation in MaGaha v. Mosley, 24 in which it was stated that "the
securities laws are remedial in nature [and] . . .should be liberally
'25
construed to protect investors.
Defendant Century Concepts, Inc. sold "Tax Advantaged Equipment Lease Programs" to more than 170 South Carolinians who invested over $3 million in the program. Defendant Jacob Shearer produced two tax opinions for the program and consented to their use as
part of a marketing campaign. The law firm of Hochman, Salkin and
DeRoy agreed to provide tax defense for investors, and representatives
of the firm met with investors in South Carolina. The opinion letters,
engagement letters, and attorneys' Martindale-Hubbell biographies
were prominently featured in Century Concepts' promotional
materials.2"
The state Deputy Securities Commissioner issued a cease and desist order on December 21, 1983, requiring Century Concepts and
others to stop selling the unregistered securities in the state. More
than seventy allegedly defrauded investors sued for damages, claiming
the investments were worthless and failed to generate the promised income and tax benefits. The California attorneys who assisted in the
preparation of the investment scheme challenged the court's jurisdiction, but the trial court refused to dismiss the action. The court of
appeals reversed the trial judge's determination of jurisdiction under
27
the Securities Act.
Because no South Carolina precedent existed "constru[ing] the
Act for the purpose of deciding what amount of participation in a sale
makes one a seller, ' 28 the court elected to rely on federal cases construing section 12(1) of the federal Securities Act of 193329 (after which the
Uniform Securities Act was modeled). The court applied Pinter v.
Dahl,s0 which held that "[tihere is no support in the statutory language or legislative history for expansion of § 12(1) primary liability
beyond persons who pass title and persons who 'offer,' including those

24. 283 S.C. 268, 322 S.E.2d 461 (Ct. App. 1984).
25. Id. at 273, 322 S.E.2d at 464.
26. This information was relied upon by investors in evaluating the tax shelter and
in their decisions to invest. Brief of Amicus Curiae, Deputy Secs. Comm'r of South Carolina at 2-3.
27. See Allen, 297 S.C. at 484-85, 377 S.E.2d at 354.
28. Id. at 486, 377 S.E.2d at 355.
29. 15 U.S.C. § 77a-aa (1982).
30. 108 S. Ct. 2063 (1988).
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who 'solicit' offers." 31

This analysis was applied to both the non-registration and misrepresentation causes of action s2 to reach the result that "being a substantial factor in causing the sale of unregistered securities is not sufficient
in itself to render a defendant liable" under South Carolina law.33 The
court never mentioned McGaha v. Mosley,34 nor did it attempt to liberally construe the Act to protect investors.
South Carolina's derivative liability provision35 also was held inapplicable by a similarly restrained analysis. Rather than using an expansive definition of "employee of a seller" for purposes of the Act, the
court adopted a limited, conservative agency law definition. The
court also denied jurisdiction over Defendant Shearer under the conspiracy complaint by imposing a demanding co-conspirator minimum
37
contacts requirement.

While the court's analysis was sound, it ignored the history of
South Carolina securities decisions. The laws of this state have been
applied aggressively to aid the wronged and punish wrongdoers.38 Following closely on the heels of Pinter,the court merely fell in step with
the Supreme Court and unnecessarily elected to follow federal precedent. Although the court referred to Carver v. Blanford39 in support of
its decision to look to federal case law for guidance in construing and
applying the Securities Act, it is helpful to examine the origin of that
4 ° in which
policy. Carver cited Bradley v. Hullander,
the court held
that "cases interpreting. . . the Securities Act of 1933, while not binding authority on this Court, are looked to for guidance in interpreting

31. Id. at 2080.
32. South Carolina Code section 35-1-1490(1) creates liability for any person who
"[offers or sells a security" in violation of the state's registration requirements or by a
material misstatement or omission. S.C. CODE ANN. § 35-1-1490(1) to (2) (Law. Co-op.
1987).
33. Allen, 297 S.C. at 487, 377 S.E.2d at 356.
34. 283 S.C. 268, 322 S.E.2d 461 (Ct. App. 1984). This case often is cited to support
the proposition that the Securities Act is to be aggressively applied for the benefit of the
investing public.
35. S.C. CODE ANN. § 35-1-1500 (Law. Co-op. 1987). This section provides in part
that "every employee of. . . a seller who materially aids in the sale
. . . to the same extent as the seller . . . ." Id.

. .

. [is] also liable

36. See Allen, 297 S.C. at 488, 377 S.E.2d at 356-57 (applying the traditional
master-servant test for "employee" as "the right of the employer, or master, to control
and direct the particular work.").
37. See id. at 490, 377 S.E.2d at 357 (declining to attribute the contacts of one
alleged conspirator to another alleged conspirator).
38. See, e.g., MeGaha, 283 S.C. 268, 322 S.E.2d 461.
39. 288 S.C. 309, 342 S.E.2d 406 (1986).
40. 272 S.C. 6, 249 S.E.2d 486 (1979).
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the corresponding South Carolina Code provision.""'
Thus, the court of appeals could have dismissed Pinter as inconsistent with this state's policy of aggressive investor protection, and
hence, inapplicable. Even though no South Carolina -decisions were
squarely on point, McGaha's liberal construction could have been cited
as controlling precedent to yield a much more investor-oriented result.
The decision to rely on Pinter may have been one of convenience (i.e.
the path of least resistance).
The attorney-defendants specifically permitted their names, reputations, credentials, and opinions to be used for promotional purposes.
This information was included for no reason other than to induce investors to entrust their money to Century Concepts.42 Reliance on
these attorneys' skills by the South Carolina "clients" was reasonably
to be expected.4" The Deputy Securities Commissioner noted, "'One of
the critical elements in promoting an abusive tax shelter scheme is the
tax opinion supplied by the promoter's tax attorney. ...

At a mini-

mum the opinion is viewed [by the investor] as fraud insurance. With
fraud insurance the investor [believes himself to be] protected against
loss.' ""

In light of the well-established duty of at least due care owed by
an attorney to his client, the defendant-attorneys should have been
charged with the knowledge that 20 percent of Century Concepts' sales
were coming from South Carolina. South Carolina's residents were the
ultimate "beneficiaries" of twenty percent of the tens of thousands of
dollars in legal fees paid to those attorneys. In other words, the South
Carolinians ultimately were the clients.
The court was impressed by the argument that Shearer was unaware of how his opinion was being utilized in South Carolina. Had this
been a malpractice case, the defendants would have virtually admitted
recklessness with this defense by wilfully failing to control the use of
their work product and neglecting to make any effort to identify or
protect their true clients.
The message to practitioners is clear: in order to reach potential
defendants who are peripherally involved with a fraudulent securities
sale, plaintiffs must rely on tort theory rather than the protection of
the Securities Act. Defendants, on the other hand, will continue to

41. Id. at 21, 249 S.E.2d at 494 (emphasis added).
42. See Record at 91-93.
43. It is interesting to note that the Securities Act decision may have been unnecessary. Based on the roles of the lawyer-defendants and the reasonable, foreseeable reliance by the investors, jurisdiction would have been a virtual certainty had this case been
presented as an attorney malpractice action.
44. Brief of Amicus Curiae at 8 (quoting Developing Standardsfor Tax Attorneys,
[Jam-Feb.] Daily Tax Rep. (BNA) No. 15, at J-1 (Jan. 22, 1980)).
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wrap themselves in a literal "form over substance" application of the
Act in an attempt to avoid liability. The result will lead to significant
inequities. South Carolina courts should reaffirm the state's longstanding commitment to investor protection by maintaining a tough stance
toward persons who violate the Securities Act. State law requirements
traditionally have been more stringent than federal statutes, and until
now state courts have not hesitated to stretch the Act to its limits in
order to find liberal remedies for injured investors.
Finally, a careful reading of Pinter reveals the court of appeals
may have relied too heavily upon that decision. Pinter was premised
almost solely upon Congressional intent. 5 Nothing in the opinion prevents this state from imposing more demanding requirements than
those imposed by federal law. Thus, courts in this state should recall
the South Carolina General Assembly's broad remedial goals and construe securities laws flexibly to effectuate their remedial purpose. Furthermore, this should be regarded as a most important objective in order to prevent South Carolina from becoming recognized as an "easy
mark" or a "safe harbor for foreign promoters of fraudulent investment
''
schemes and their accomplices. 46

Kenneth J. Mitteldorf

45. See Pinter v. Dahl, 108 S. Ct. 2063, 2082 (1988).
46. Brief of Amicus Curiae at 26.
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